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The People: The Least Accountable
Branch
MARCI A. HAMILTONt
Representation guards against "rashness, precipitancy and misguided
zeal."'
The United States is at a critical juncture in its constitutional history.
Many forces have called into question the vitality and even validity of our
representative form of democracy. Despite the Founders' appreciation for and
deference to representative decision-making as a bulwark against tyranny, the
growing use and influence of the Internet and initiative lawmaking combined
with an overly willing subscription to the primacy of self-rule have clouded
our respect for the vital importance of representative democracy.
The advent of a global communication structure has posed an obvious
attack. At first a self-consciously and intentionally anarchical world of comput-
er hackers, the Internet premised its anti-authoritarian ethos on an absolute
right to have access to information.2 The Internet has matured to the point,
however, that it is no longer solely the property of the fringe. Rather, we now
have a sophisticated information infrastructure that is viewed as a tool for the
various power centers in society and has become the darling of governments,
politicians, and citizens around the world.' According to some politicians, this
so-called Information Era could enable the United States to effect a system of
t. Marci A. Hamilton is Professor of Law at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
She would like to thank Elizabeth Garrett for her helpful comments on an earlier draft
and Harley Goldstein and Erin McGahey for their invaluable research assistance.
1. Rice v Foster, 4 Del (4 Harr) 479, 487 (1847) (quoting Federalist 51 (Madison)).
2. Marci Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated and Overprotective,
29 Vand J Trans L 613, 625-26 (1996).
3. One important indicator of this transition exists in the federal government's report
on the National Information Infrastructure, White Paper, Intellectual Property and the
National Information Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual
Property Rights 179 (1995), and in the international agreements reached at WIPO in
December in Geneva.
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massive self-rule.' Technological capacities make a town-meeting style of de-
mocracy more attractive than ever, or so the argument goes.'
The second, more subtle, attack on representative democracy takes the
form of state initiatives.6 Most popular in the western states, the initiative
ballot process permits individual voters to make the law directly from the
voting booth. California, for example, now regularly makes statutory and
constitutional law by shifting difficult policy choices away from accountable
legislators to individual citizens.7
The logical conclusion of possessivism individualism, a belief that self-rule
is the most legitimate form of government, constitutes the third threat to
representative democracy. Possessivism individualism is an implicit cultural
presupposition that stands behind the creation and promotion of the Internet
as a political tool, behind state initiatives, and behind the seemingly self-
proving value of self-rule. Owing at least part of its force to laissez-faire
economics, some versions of which presuppose that self-interest drives every
human decision,' such a deceptively easy stance glosses over the important
distinctions between an individual reaching a decision in private and a leg-
islator making a decision in public. Structurally, the two methods of decision-
4. Id. See also 141 Cong Rec S10484-01 (July 21, 1995) (statement of Senator Pat-
rick J. Leahy (D-Vt)) ("I believe I was probably the first Senator to actively hold town
meetings on the Internet.").
S. See, for example, Michael Kelly, Perot's Vision: Consensus by Computer, NY
Times Al (June 6, 1992); Joe Abernathy, Hungry Candidates Might Share a Byte,
Houston Chronicle A21 (May 3, 1992); Jeffrey J. Rose, New Political Forum: The Bulletin
Boards of PC 'modemocracy', San Diego Union-Trib Al (Oct 19, 1992); Sarah Kellog, Di-
rect Democracy Proponents Foresee Citizenry Taking Over, Plain Dealer 18A (July 24,
1994); Arlene Levinson, Silent Majority Is Suddenly Speaking Up By Phone, FAX, even E-
Mail, LA Times 28A (Sept 25, 1994).
On-line advocates united to express their displeasure with congressional efforts to
censor "indecent" material on the Internet by taking part in an "Internet Day of Protest."
It is reported that approximately 20,000 people communicated their opinion to the
committee via e-mail, fax or telephone. See P.J. Huffstutter, Lawmakers, Internet Fail to
Click, San Diego Union-Trib Al (Jan 1, 1996). Although there has been some skepticism
expressing doubt of the rise of an "electronic democracy," its popularity is destined to
grow as government officials at local, state, and federal levels get on-line, establish e-mail
addresses, and invite comments from their constituents. See id at A20.
6. See Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 Yale L J 1503, 1509
n 22, 1510 nn 23-25, and app A (1990).
7. Id at 1508, 1509 n 22.
8. See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of
Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U Chi L Rev 263, 267 (1982) ("[M]odern economic
theory [views] legislation as the outcome of a struggle between interest groups."); William
M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Per-
spective, 18 J L & Econ 875, 877 (1975) ("[L]egislation is 'sold' by the legislature and
'bought' by the beneficiaries of the legislation."). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the
Republican Revival, 97 Yale L J 1539, 1547 (1988) ("[It is] hard to deny that elements
of pluralism provide a central feature of modem politics.").
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making could not be more different, and the Framers of the Constitution
fundamentally understood this vital point.
In the midst of these attacks, the reasons for choosing representative
democracy over self-rule have been buried or ignored. As a frank apologist for
representative democracy, I offer the following criticisms of direct democracy.
In a nutshell, the clarion call of self-rule has duped us into misreading history
and into misunderstanding the advantages of a representative system.
I. The Framers Chose Representative Democracy and Rejected Direct
Democracy
A product of its time, the Constitution reflects two concrete, vivid, and
mechanistic images prevalent in writings at the time of the Framing-a clock
and a solar system.9 Intending to set in motion a machine with internal
mechanisms that would ensure its efficient operation," the Framers created a
mechanistic contraption, known as the Constitution of the United States. •
Reflecting on images of a clock and a solar system offers a wealth of
information on what qualities the Framers hoped to instill into their new
experiment with democracy. These images portray three qualities: indepen-
dence, interdependence, and balance. The Framers intended to capture each of
these three qualities simultaneously in the design of the federal government.
Powerfully depicting the concept of independence, both the clock and the
solar system have discrete elements assigned particular tasks and spheres. Each
cog has its own function, each planet its own path. The independence inherent
in the constitutional equation is similarly evident on the face of the Constitu-
9. James Madison stated that, like the check between the two branches of the
National Government, the General Government would "controul the centrifugal tendency
of the States; which, without it, will continually fly out of their proper orbits and destroy
the order and harmony of the political system." James Madison, Notes of Debates in the
Federal Convention of 1787 89 (Adrienne Koch, ed, Norton 1966). See also id at 85
(statement of James Wilson); id at 84-85 (statement of John Dickinson); Catherine Drinker
Bowen, Miracle at Philadelphia 79 (H. Hamilton 1966) (stating that Solar System image
would dominate the Convention's thinking of the Constitution); James H. Smylie, Presbyte-
rian Clergy and Problems of "Dominion" in the Revolutionary Generation, 48 J Presbyte-
rian Hist 161, 167 (1970) (referring to the "interrelated checks and balances which may
be found in a clock or watch" as a "favorite image of the eighteenth century.").
10. Many have recognized the mechanistic intention of the Founders.
It has been assumed in the past that a Lockean individualism and Adam Smith
competitiveness explain the mechanics of our Constitution as expounded in the
Federalist papers. But Smith believed in competing systems (formed by a co-operative
division of labor) rather than individualism. And moral sympathy drove society's
whole machinery in his theory. Social mechanics were developed in a subtle and
thorough way by the Scots, who taught a whole generation of the founding fathers.
Dr. Witherspoon at Princeton especially loved the principle of social "overpoise," as
he called it; and his student James Madison drew on Hume's essays in writing
Federalist 10, the classic exposition of social mechanics.
Garry Wills, Inventing America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence 289 (Vintage 2d
ed 1979).
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tion. Each of the three federal branches are described in individual Articles,
and each Article assigns each branch distinguishable powers and obligations.
The discrete elements of a clock or a solar system, however, are not
individual islands. Although the elements composing a clock or a solar system
are discrete and individually identifiable, each element's function is inter-linked
with the function of all the other elements within the clock or solar system.
Not one element is an outlier in either image. While each and every element
has its own task, neither the clock nor the solar system can realize its full
capacity unless the disparate elements work in conjunction toward the same
goal. No one clock gear can go on strike without ruining the entire operation
and no planet may leave its path without throwing the others' paths into
disarray.
For the same reasons, the work of the federal government cannot go
forward unless the three federal branches, as well as the federal government
and the state governments, operate in tandem toward mutually agreeable goals.
To state the principle at its most basic level, Congress' law making capacity is
meaningless, or at least severely restricted, without the President to enforce the
law or the courts to interpret it. As the Supreme Court recently observed, our
federal "system imposes upon the Branches a degree of overlapping responsibil-
ity, a duty of interdependence as well as independence, the absence of which
'would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself
effectively.'"'"
Finally, neither a watch nor a solar system will hold together unless its
independent, yet interdependent elements achieve a certain all-important
balance. No clock cog and no single planet completely dominates. Each has its
distinctive potential and contribution, while all share equally in the attainment
of the system's purpose. Each element is indispensable and if any element
deviates from its designated role, the whole suffers.
Experienced as a palpable danger by the Framers, for whom the Revolu-
tion against Britain was a fresh event, tyranny was an ever-present threat to
democracy. Thus, one of the Framers' overriding goals in crafting the constitu-
tional machine was to avoid tyranny in its many forms.'" The Framers rea-
11. US Const, Art I, II, and Il1.
12. Clinton v Jones, No. 95-1853, 1997 WL 273679, at *11 (May 27, 1997), quoting
Mistretta v United States, 448 US 361, 381 (1989), quoting Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1,
121 (1976).
13. See Federalist 47 (Madison), in Garry Wills, ed, The Federalist Papers by Alex-
ander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay 244 (Bantam 1982) ("The accumulation of
all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few
or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the
very definition of tyranny."). See also Marci A. Hamilton, The First Amendment's
Challenge Function and the Confusion in the Supreme Court's Contemporary Free Exercise
Jurisprudence, 29 Ga L Rev 81, 85-90 (1994); Marci A. Hamilton, Discussion and Deci-
sions: A Proposal to Replace the Myth of Self-Rule with an Attorneyship Model of
Representation, 69 NYU L Rev 477, 540 (1994).
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soned that power must be limited and exercised responsibly if democracy was
to succeed.
14
As depicted in the images of the clock and the solar system, decentraliza-
tion of power was one of the primary mechanical means employed by the
Framers towards the end of avoiding tyranny. While attempting to strengthen
the federal government after the failure of the Articles of Confederation, the
Framers chose both to buttress the powers of the federal branches and to
distribute power among the three branches in an attempt to decentralize and
cabin what they feared could become overweening power
Consciously choosing to divide power, the Framers chose to spread power
between the organs of social control with many creative devices. First, they
created three independent, interdependent, and balanced federal branches."5
Second, they structured a system of dual sovereignty in which the federal
government would coexist with a significant number of state governments,
many of which were quite powerful at the time.16 Third, the decentralization
drive is even evident in particular clauses, such as the Copyright Clause where
the Framers followed England's Statute of Anne 7 by vesting copyright in
authors rather than publishers." Granting copyright to authors was motivated
by the understanding that publishers are more likely to become holders of
concentrated power than are authors. Finally, with the addition of the Bill of
14. According to Montesquieu, "[p]olitical liberty is to be found only in moderate
governments.... It is present only when power is not abused, but it has eternally been
observed that any man who has power is led to abuse it; he continues until he finds
limits. Who would think it! Even virtue has need of limits. So that one cannot abuse
power, power must check power by the arrangement of things." Montesquieu, The Spirit
of the Laws, Book XI, ch 4, at 155 (Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, and Harold
Samuel Stone, trans) (Cambridge 1989). As similarly envisioned by the Framers, "[tihe
different [branches of] government[] will controul each other; at the same time that each
will be controuled by itself." Federalist 51 (Madison), in Wills, ed, Federalist Papers at
264 (cited in note 13).
15. Compare US Const Art I, 5 1 with Art II, S 1 and Art Ell, S 1. See also, for
example, Federalist 47 (Madison), in Wills, ed, Federalist Papers at 244 (cited in note 13)
("the three great departments of power should be separate and distinct").
16. For example, US Coast, Amend X. See, for example, Federalist 9 (Hamilton), in
Wills, ed, Federalist Papers at 41 (cited in note 13) ("The proposed Constitution, so far
from implying an abolition of the State Governments, makes them constituent parts of the
national sovereignty by allowing them a direct representation in the Senate, and leaves in
their possession certain exclusive and very important portions of sovereign power. This
fully corresponds, in every rational import of the terms, with the idea of a Federal
Government."); Federalist 45 (Madison), in id at 232-37; Federalist 46 (Madison), in id
at 237-43.
17. Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1709, 8 Anne, ch 19. One purpose behind
this statute's adoption may have been reducing the monopoly power of the publishing
industry and decentralizing that power by placing it in the hands of individual authors.
18. US Const, Art 1, S 8, clause 8. Antitrust law takes this constitutional norm into
the marketplace. See generally James May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the
Formative Era: The Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880-
1918, 135 U Pa L Rev 495 (1987).
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Rights, the Constitution explicitly divided power between the church and the
state and reserved all unenumerated powers and rights to the states and the
people. 9
The Framers believed that the distribution of power was the best insurance
against tyranny because power by its very nature is propulsive. 0 Without
mechanisms automatically checking its exercise, the Framers experienced
firsthand that the holder of power is likely to overstep appropriate bounds.
The People, with a capital "P," get no more deference in the Constitution on
this score than any other institution within the society.
Like every other social organ examined by the Framers, the people are
equally capable of overstepping their authority.2 They are the invisible fourth
branch, a branch that is just as important as any of the other three federal
branches and, most relevant to this essay, just as in need of checks on the
exercise of its powers. The possibility of mob rule, of the tyranny of the
majority, and of the passing passions of mobilized interest groups was as real
and acutely threatening to the Framers as was the remembered tyranny of
Britain's crown.'
The siren song of direct democracy or self-rule, however, paints the People
as the one structure within the polity not in need of checks and balances. If
we listen carefully and heed the Framers' warnings, we cannot help but hear
how dangerous a song this can be.
The Constitution's deeply pragmatic message is clear. A collection of
individuals, each voting for his own preferences without reference to the
greater good, is decidedly less desirable than a system of representation
wherein representatives are held accountable to the public good for every
substantive decision reached. The structure of the Constitution forces represen-
tatives to be trustees of the people's interest. Granted, individual performances
often disappoint, but the Constitution's structure forces every decision into the
19. US Const, Amend I, IX, and X. See Hamilton, 29 Ga L Rev at 93-95 (cited in
note 13).
20. See Hamilton, 69 NYU L Rev at 540 (cited in note 13), citing Bernard Bailyn,
The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 162-63 (Belknap 1967).
21. See James Madison, Notes of Debates at 75-77 (cited in note 9). See also Feder-
alist 10 (Madison) in Wills, ed, Federalist Papers at 46 (cited in note 13) ("the majority,
having such co-existent passion or interest, must be rendered . . . unable to concert and
carry into effect schemes of oppression").
22. See Federalist 10 (Madison), in Wills, ed, Federalist Papers at 42-43 (cited in note
13) ("Complaints are every where heard . . . that our governments are too unstable; that
the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties; and that measures are too
often decided, not according to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party; but
by the superior force of an interested and over-bearing majority."); Milner S. Ball, The
Promise of American Law: A Theological, Humanistic View of Legal Process 32 (Georgia
1981), quoting Federalist 14 (Madison) ("The private no less than the public requires
limitation .... Accordingly, the Bill of Rights draws bounded ranges for both 'private
rights and public happiness.'"); Federalist 15 (Hamilton), in Wills, ed, Federalist Papers at
72 ("mhe passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason without con-
straint.").
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crucible of public scrutiny, thereby forcing accountability. The combined forces
of the press, the voting booth, and the natural human tendency to shrink from
public disapprobation create a constitutional structure designed to hold
representatives accountable and force their decisions to take into account many
views including the larger public good. Moreover; representatives' decisions,
unlike those made through direct democracy, are traceable. Once decisions are
made and go awry, there is no question in a representative system where t6,
place the blame-it rests squarely on the representatives' shoulders. Secret
ballot voting by the people does not admit of the same advantage.
Contrary to the assertions of possessivism individualism, the truth is that
the Constitution places no lawmaking power in the hands of the people. Even
though the town-meeting style of democracy was plainly visible to the Framers
in many of the colonies, as well as in the Greek system of democracy referred
to more than once during the Convention, the Framers made no provisions for
such lawmaking.' While the Ninth and Tenth Amendments state that the
people get the Constitution's "leftovers," the powers and rights not mentioned
in the Constitution, the Constitution plainly structured the process of lawmak-
ing to "filterl" the people's views.24
The Framers did not simply have a distaste for popular lawmaking, but
rather theorized within a distinctly Calvinist and Presbyterian framework which
elevates representation over both monarchy and direct democracy. John
Calvin's history-changing ideas about reforming the Christian church, he
believed and later Calvinists believed, were equally applicable to govern-
ment.2s Calvinist views are reflected in the Framer's discussion of the dangers
of direct democracy and their concerns about the propulsive quality of power
within the hands of any social entity or government official.26
Although Calvin believed that if he were "to go over the faults of ecclesi-
astical government in detail, [he] should never have done,"27 he delineated
two chief evils in the pre-Reformation Church: (1) the shirking of responsibili-
ty by church leaders and (2) the failure to serve the people.2" He accused
church leaders of "cruel tyranny" and "lawless, unrestricted domination.""
The American Presbyterian Church's Constitution reflects the preference for
representation over direct democracy and for responsible leaders: "Presbyters
23. Madison, Notes of Debates at 83-84 (cited in note 9).
24. Eule, 99 Yale L J at 1528 (cited in note 6).
25. John Calvin, 2 Institutes of the Christian Religion Book IV, ch XX 30-32 (John
T. McNeill, ed, Ford Lewis Battles, trans, 1975); John T. McNeill, The History and
Character of Calvinism 364 (Oxford 1954).
26. Even if the Presbyterian system in the United States was not the only model for
federalism and representation available to the Framers, the Presbyterian Synod was the best
example of representative popular government at that time. See generally Frederick W.
Loetscher, 200th Anniversary of the Adopting Act 10 (1814).
27. John Calvin, 1 Tracts and Treatises on the Reformation of the Church 140
(Eerdmans 1958) (The Necessity of Reforming the Church).
28. Id at 140-41.
29. Id at 143.
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[representatives within the church] are not simply to reflect the will of the
people, but rather to seek together to find and represent the will of Christ.
Decisions shall be reached in governing bodies by vote, following opportunity
for discussion, and a majority shall govern."3" When translated into the
context of government, this means that representatives are to do what is best
for the people.3
The Framers were not content to require representative democracy solely
for the federal government. The Guarantee Clause requires the states as well
as the federal government to institute a system of representation rather than
direct democracy. 2 Apparently, direct democracy was no more valuable in the
states than it was at the federal level. In fact, the Guarantee Clause makes
plain the importance placed on representation over direct democracy. The
Framers relied on representative democracy at all levels, instituting structural
and essential limitations on the power of the people, in order to keep the
constitutional clock running and the governmental solar system revolving.
The Framers' ultimate preference fow -eDresentative government was not
reached in the absence of deliberation. The Framers identified three primary
options for governing society: monarchy, which they flatly and righteously re-
jected; direct democracy, which they also rejected; and representative democra-
cy, which they chose.33 A proposal that representatives would be subject to
a right to instruct from their constituents, which would have created a repre-
sentative system much closer to direct democracy was also rejected.34
30. The Constitution of the Presbyterian Church (USA), Part II, Book of Order (The
Office of the General Assembly).
31. James Wilson made this point most eloquently.
He considered himself as acting & responsible for the welfare of millions not
immediately represented in this house. He had also asked himself the serious
question what he should say to his constituents in case they should call upon him
to tell them why he sacrificed his own Judgment in a case where they authorized
him to exercise it? Were he to own to them that he sacrificed it in order to flatter
their prejudices, he should dread the retort: did you suppose the people of
Penn[sylvania] has not good sense enough to receive a good Government?
James Madison, 2 The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the
Constitution of the United States of America 399 (Gaillard Hunt and James B. Scott, eds,
Prometheus Books 1987).
32. US Const, Art IV, S 4. See generally, Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the
Guarantee Clause Should Be Justiciable, 65 U Colo L Rev 849, 867 (1994); Deborah
Jones Merritt, Republican Governments and Autonomous States: A New Role For the
Guarantee Clause, 65 U Colo L Rev 815, 819 (1994). See also Marci A. Hamilton,
Power, Responsibility and Republican Democracy, 93 Mich L Rev 1539, 1542 (1995)
(book review of David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses
the People Through Delegation (Yale 1993)).
33. Madison, Notes of Debates at 46 (cited in note 9) (Wilson rejects the British
monarchy as a model for establishing Executive powers); id at 74 (Wilson states that
"[riepresentation is made necessary only because it is impossible for the people to act
collectively"); id at 193-95 (Madison discusses that representatives are entrusted by the
people to secure the public happiness).
34. The Constitutional Convention definitively defeated a proposal that legislators
should be subject to a right to instruct. See Joseph Gales, ed, 1 Annals of Congress 757-
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Highlighting the Framers' unmistakable rejection of direct democracy is not
to suggest that the people were not, and are not, a potent presence within the
constitutional scheme. The people's power lies in the voting booth and in the
public square. Voting in elections for representatives and vigorous political
discussion and debate curb the excesses of politicians and make elected
representatives accountable to their constituents. Yet, during the tenure of their
representation, they are given decision-making power that is independent of the
people. In what surely presages the Framers' belief in the necessity of an
educated polity and of free speech rights that make it possible to challenge
government hegemony, the means of reducing tyranny for Calvin were a
representative and accountable church structure, which requires members who
can read Scripture in order to prevent their being duped by their leaders."'
The Constitution frees representatives from direct control by the people
during the term of representation so that they may make the decisions that are
in the country's best interest. During the term of representation, they are given
decisionmaking power that is independent of the people. 6
Article V is a good example of the Constitution's rejection of the people
as a lawmaking entity. Popular sovereignty is limited to the concept that the
people are the source of social power."' Article V does not permit the people
to easily amend their Constitution; indeed, it contains no provision that
empowers the people, per se, to make any change in the Constitution. Article
V discourages those intent on amending the agreed-upon Constitution by
requiring that they act only through Congress or state conventions and allows
them to prevail only with a super-majority of states. 8
58 (1789). See also, Marci A Hamilton, 69 NYU L Rev at 523-27 (cited in note 13).
Wilson, who strongly favored representatives to maintain close communication with their
constituents yet were to exercise independent judgment for the common good, came closest
to an agency notion. His commitment to direct election of both houses of Congress and
the President by the people was unequalled among the Framers. See Robert G. McCloskey,
James Wilson, in 1 Leon Friedman and Fred L. Israel, eds, The Justices of the United
States Supreme Court 1789-1969: Their Lives and Major Opinions 79, 88 (Chelsea House
1969).
During the Constitutional Convention, some believed that indirect election of the
President and the Senate would appropriately shield representatives from factional and
constituent pressure. See Madison, Notes of Debates at 190-01 (cited in note 9) (statement
of George Mason of Virginia). A constitutional amendment changes the election of
senators to direct election. See US Const, Art I, §3, clause 1 (election of senators by state
legislatures), amended by US Const, Amend XVII, S 1 (direct election of senators). The
one vestige of the Convention's attempt to mediate the effects of popular voting, the elec-
toral college, has not been the political power that is was assumed it would be and has
been repeatedly criticized because it "undemocratically separates people from the presiden-
tial election process." Michael J. O'Sullivan, Artificial Unit Voting and the Electoral
College, 65 S Cal L Rev 2421, 2421 & na 3-4 (1992).
35. Calvin, 1 Tracts and Treatises at 144 (cited in note 27).
36. See Marci A. Hamilton 69 NYU L Rev at 481 (cited in note 13).
37. See Robert Green McCloskey, ed, 1 The Works of James Wilson 177 (Belknap
1967) (Representatives "act, not by their own power, but by the power of those whom
they represent."); Hamilton, 69 NYU L Rev at 530 (cited in note 13).
38. US Const, Art V. The plain language of Article V belies Professor Akhil Reed
19971
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The force of the self-rule myth proves the necessity of checks on direct
democracy. The Framers set into motion a clock, a solar system of social
powers in which the people were to hold a privileged, but limited, place. Two
hundred years later, some seem to be persuaded they are the government. This
exaggerated sense of the people's power is not surprising given power's
propulsive propensities. Power has the ability to seduce the people every bit as
much as the President, the Congress, or the courts.
The self-rule myth is fueled by a fundamental confusion over the meaning
of sovereignty. For one example, Professor Akhil Reed Amar has even suggest-
ed that constitutional amendment need not occur through Article V of the
Constitution because popular sovereignty means that the people can rule
through simple majorities.39 Through misinterpreting the views of Framer
James Wilson,' Professor Amar has permitted the myth of self-rule to over-
come the plain language of Article V.
Popular sovereignty means that the people are the source of all power, not
that it is wise to rest direct lawmaking power in their hands. Indeed, the
Constitution is devoid of any provision effecting direct popular rule on any
issue. Instead, the Constitution places checks and balances on the exercise of
the people's power by vesting the power to make law in representative
legislatures, whether federal or state.4 Article V's allocation of the lawmaking
power wisely slows the temptation to act hastily and on specious reasoning by
placing meaningful barriers in the path of mob rule.
II. Popular Lawmaking
Despite the Framers' purposeful rejection of direct democracy, popular
lawmaking initiatives have become increasingly popular, the most vivid exam-
ple being the California initiative and referendum process. The idea that this
process in any way promotes valuable democracy is a product of the self-rule
myth. A worse decision-making process could not be imagined.
In California's initiative process, shortly before the election, voters receive
a catalog of initiatives drafted in incomprehensible language and printed in tiny
type. It is virtually impossible to tell whether a given measure requires a "yes"
Amar's suggestions to the contrary. For Professor Amar's views, see Akhil Reed Amar, The
Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 Colum L Rev
457 (1994). See also Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution
Outside Article V, 55 U Chi L Rev 1043 (1988) (arguing that the Constitution may be
amended by popular vote).
39. See Amar, 94 Colum L Rev at 507-08 (cited in note 38).
40. Amar, 94 Colum L Rev at 474-91, 495-507 (cited in note 38). See Henry Paul
Monaghan, We The People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96
Colum L Rev 121, 125-39 (1996). In fact, James Wilson's ideals were of an agency
notion of representation, not of self-government. Hamilton, 69 NYU L Rev at 529 (cited
in note 13). Wilson emphasized that representatives should engage in independent judgment
informed by contact with the people. Id.
41. See US Const, Art I and W.
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or a "no" vote for approval.42 Voters surveyed have admitted that they
reached their decision on the basis of commercials and then, in the voting
booth, crossed their fingers in the hopes that their actual vote was accomplish-
ing what they thought they wanted to do.43 Moreover, as Professor Elizabeth
Garrett points out, popular lawmaking is no less subject to the coercive
influence of "special interests" than is legislative lawmaking.4
The recent California ballot initiative, Proposition 209, in which the people
of California rejected affirmative action in state organizations, invites a
reexamination of the pitfalls and the potential of direct democracy.4- Voters
in California were asked to vote in the privacy of a voting booth on the
following proposal:
The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment
to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or
national origin in the operation of public employment, public education,
or public contracting."
The inevitable challenges to Proposition 209 have focused on the Equal
Protection Clause and the Supreme Court decisions in Hunter v Erickson47
and Washington v Seattle School District.4s The Coalition for Economic
Equity has challenged the law in the courts. The Coalition has argued that
Proposition 209 exhibits improper "racial focus" because "the reality is that
the law's impact falls on the minority" and restructures the political process to
the disadvantage of women and minorities.49 The district court was persuad-
ed; the Court of Appeals was not. ° Without taking a stand on Proposition
209's Equal Protection merits or demerits, I will use Proposition 209 as an
example to illustrate the real dangers of direct democracy.
Proposition 209 encompasses two statements. First, it is a restatement of
"existing anti-discrimination protections already provided by the United States
and California Constitutions, and by the 1964 Civil Rights Act." s" Second,
42. See Eule, 99 Yale L J at 1508-09, 1516-19, 1569-70 (cited in note 6).
43. Id at 1517-18.
44. See Elizabeth Garrett, Who Directs Direct Democracy?, 4 U Chi L Sch Roundtable
17, 21-23 (1997).
45. See Coalition For Economic Equity v Wilson, 110 F3d 1431 (9th Cir 1997), va-
cating 946 F Supp 1480 (ND Cal 1996). See also Rice, 4 Del (4 Harr) at 487 (cited in
note 1) (quoting extensively from Federalist 51 (Madison)).
The Clinton Administration rightly opposed the initiative. See Brief for Amicus
United States, Coalition For Economic Equity v Wilson, 110 F3d 1431, 1440 (9th Cir
1997).
46. CA Const, Art 1, S 31(a).
47. 393 US 385 (1969).
48. 458 US 457 (1982).
49. Brief of Appellees 39-47, Coalition for Economic Equity v Wilson 110 F3d 1431
(9th Cir 1997) (Nos 97-15030, 97-15031).
50. 946 F Supp 1480 (ND Cal 1996), vacated 110 F3d 1431 (9th Cir 1997).
51. Id at 1488.
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given that affirmative action may only be employed constitutionally to battle
proven historical discrimination, 2 it is a decision by a majority of the voting
public of California that affirmative action programs may not be employed in
order to battle even such ingrained discrimination. To the extent that it
restates existing law, it is uncontroversial. To the extent that it adds an
additional bar to affirmative action as a remedy for discrimination, it raises
serious and interesting constitutional questions.
Setting aside the Equal Protection concerns raised by the law, it is informa-
tive to focus upon who made the law because the law is tainted, as is any
product of direct democracy, by its process. A citizen who makes the law from
a voting booth votes in private, has the right not to tell anyone how he voted,
and indeed can lie about his vote with impunity. As a structural matter,
superstition and ignorance are as welcome participants in such a vote as is
introspection and education. If there were ever a scenario when prejudice and
foolishness could triumph, this would be it. As a result, the secret ballot voter
can foreclose one of the few means of redressing persistent societal discrim-
ination against minorities without having to articulate reasons to the public
and, perhaps more importantly, even to himself. The scenario offers no
mechanism of accountability sufficient to make the benefits of education and
soul-searching outweigh their costs.
The key constitutional value missing from the direct democracy scenario is
accountability. In 1977, Senator James Abourezk stated that the initiative
process is "unique among our democratic rights, [and] founded on the belief
that the citizens of this country are indeed as competent to enact legislation as
we are to elect public officials to represent us."5 3He misses the point, as does
so much of the rhetoric surrounding direct democracy and self-rule, that
competence and respect for popular sovereignty cannot make up for the
absence of accountability. Direct democracy lacks the "checks on purely selfish
conduct" inherent in a system of representative democracy in which the
decisionmakers are interested in reelection and subjected to a powerful and
lively press. 4 Without accountability, the incentive for deliberation experi-
enced by representatives disappears.5 5 The absence of accountability feeds
ignorance and self-deception, which in turn reduces the likelihood that any
individual voter will be competent to vote on the issue.
We should not assume, as the economists would, that real-life voters
automatically vote out of relatively well-informed self-interest. Where artic-
ulation and introspection are not structurally built into the voting process, the
52. See City of Richmond v J.A. Croson Co., 488 US 469 (1989); Adarand Construc-
tors, Inc. v Pena, 515 US 200 (1995).
53. 123 Cong Rec S11,582 (daily ed July 11, 1977).
54. Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local
Government Law, 86 Mich L Rev 930, 937 (1988).
55. Daniel M. Warner, Direct Democracy: The Right of the People to Make Fools of
Themselves, 19 Seattle U L Rev 47, 100 (1995) (describing the initiatives and referenda
as "non-deliberative systems tending to produce divisive legislation").
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average voter is an unreliable decision-maker. Therefore, it is more likely that
the average vote, even on matters of paramount social importance, is a
product of self-deception and ignorance.
Such concerns are especially pronounced where minority interests are at
stake, as they were in Proposition 209. Worries about the "tyranny of the
majority" are a familiar refrain in the legal literature.56 Such worries, howev-
er, are almost always erroneously expressed in the context of discussing laws
that are the product of a representative system. This equation of representation
with majoritarianism is one of the cardinal errors of contemporary political
theory.' Majoritarianism is not a necessary corollary to representation. To
the contrary, the cure for majoritarianism is representation.5 ' By contrast,
direct democracy is a "majoritarian tool." 9
Representation mediates the problem of the tyranny of the majority
because representatives are not the people themselves but independent and
accountable decision-makers. It is direct democracy, instead, that invites
majoritarian tyranny. Indeed, the Framers' preference for representation was
intended to mediate the problem of the unruly mob and the ill-informed ma-
jority guiding the law away from the interests of the people.6'
What is a court to do when faced with the product of such a dismissal of
the representative process? As I have argued vigorously before, courts should
not attempt to fix the failures of the legislative process by attempting to bring
in participants who were excluded from the process or attempt to skew the
interpretation of a statute away from special interests who were involved.
Courts are not legislators and do not have the institutional capacity to act as
stand-in legislators. Although, in certain highly publicized cases, their decisions
are subjected to the public glare, courts are structurally less accountable than
any legislator
Two paths will lead more directly to the constitutional balance envisioned
by the Framers. First, the Guarantee Clause should be found to be justicia-
56. See generally, for example, Eule, 99 Yale L J 1503 (cited in note 6). But see
Judith F. Daar, Direct Democracy and Bioethical Choices: Voting Life and Death at the
Ballot Box, 28 U Mich J L Ref 799, 834, 841-42 (1995) (arguing that direct democracy
and citizen lawmaking can be used to stimulate legislative action).
57. See generally Hamilton, 69 NYU L Rev at 479-83, 523-33 (cited in note 13).
58. One need only read the work of Mancur Olson to understand that representative
systems are not as susceptible to majorities as they are to well-orchestrated messages
delivered by cohesive small groups. See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action
127-28 (Harvard 2d ed 1971). See also id at 144 (arguing that "the organized and active
interest of small groups tend to triumph over the unorganized and unprotected interests
of larger groups").
59. Richard Briffault, Distrust of Democracy, 63 Tex L Rev 1347, 1364 (1984)
(reviewing David B. Magleby, Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions in the
United States (Johns Hopkins 1984).
60. See id at 1364.
61. See Hamilton, 69 NYU L Rev at 544-50 (cited in note 13). But see Jane S.
Schacter, The Pursuit of "Popular Intent": Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy,
105 Yale L J 107, 152-59, 161-64 (1995).
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ble."2 Professor Julian Eule makes an understandable point when he urges
more rigorous review of direct democracy in light of the Guarantee Clause,63
but I am skeptical of any court's ability to draw such a line. What does it
mean to use a nonjusticiable principle to more rigorously apply a separate
constitutional principle, like equal protection? Much more straightforward and
constitutionally defensible is Professor Chemerinsky's suggestion that the courts
recognize the Guarantee Clause's justiciability. This is no doubt strong med-
icine, but strong medicine is exactly what society needs to protect itself against
standardless, silent, and secret decision-makers.
Second, the tide of direct democracy should be stemmed, while the wise
reasons for representative democracy are revived and recirculated. Instead of
telling the courts to quietly clean up the mess, we should prevent the mess in
the first place.
III. Conclusion
The Framers carefully crafted a mechanistic Constitution in which the
People are the fourth branch and, like any branch of government, an impor-
tant power that must be checked and balanced. The emerging popularity of
popular initiatives and the attention paid to the global information structure
as a tool of self-rule evidence that representative government has somehow
gone awry.
Admittedly, times have changed since the time of the Framing, but have
these changes made direct democracy a wise choice? A lively and powerful
press has been established that is capable of informing the people of more
than they ever wanted to know." Literacy has increased dramatically."
Education is available to a broader segment of society." The franchise has
been dramatically expanded.67 Despite these changes and countless others, the
Framers' insights are not out of date, but retain their essential force.
62. Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should Be Justiciable, 65
U Colo L Rev 849, 852, 867-68 (1994).
63. Julian Eule, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: State Courts, Voter Initiatives, and the
Threat of Electoral Reprisal, 65 U Colo L Rev 733, 735 (1994).
64. See Harvey J. Graff, The Legacies of Literacy: Continuities and Contradictions in
Western Culture and Society 353 (Indiana 1987) (From 1790 to 1840, the number of
different newspapers published in the United States rose from 92 to 1,404.).
65. See id at 375-77 (From 1870 to the middle of the twentieth century, illiteracy in
the United States dropped from twenty percent to under three percent.).
66. See Elchanan Cohn, The Economics of Education 85 Table 4-5 (Ballinger 1975)
(Enrollment in United States institutes of higher education rose from 238,000 at the turn
of this century to 6,902,000 in 1968.).
67. See Ward E.Y. Elliott, The Rise of Guardian Democracy: The Supreme Court's
Role in Voting Rights Disputes, 1845-1969 82-94 (Harvard 1974). For a study of earlier
suffrage reform and the elimination of property ownership as a qualification to vote, see
Chilton Williamson, American Suffrage From Property to Democracy 1760-1860 (Princeton
1960).
Least Accountable Branch 15
If anything, contemporary practice reinforces the Framers' insights. The
difference between the roles played by representatives making governing
decisions and individuals making such decisions remains significant. Representa-
tives are "trustee[s]," charged with making decisions not only on behalf of, but
also in the interest of, the people." While they do not always do so, the
constitutional structure is rigorous and provides a standard against which
representatives' performance can be critiqued.'
In contrast, an individual enters a solitary voting booth with no trustee
obligation. The individual typically asks only, "What's in it for me?" Yet, the
individual typically cannot accurately gauge the answer to even such a narrow
question. Even if a voter's answer to that question coincidentally serves the
public's interest, the private vote is not structured, nor generally likely, to
achieve the end of societal good. Direct democracy, or the public initiative,
lends itself to misguided yes/no votes, not to the scrutiny, deliberation, com-
promise, and horse-trading necessary to solve hard social problems with some
hope of finality.
My students sometimes ask, "If the representative is not merely exercising
her preferences, what is she using?" The answer, in a nutshell, is judgment.
Representatives have the structural role of exercising leadership and applying
wisdom to hard problems in the fishbowl of public life. This is a far cry from
the exercise of simple unchecked self-interest that can attend the individual
voter asked to decide matters of public import in the privacy of a voting
booth.
In addition to recognizing that we have strayed from the Founders'
essential observations about representative democracy and the independence,
interdependence and balance it requires, we must take a closer look to accu-
rately determine exactly where our government today has departed from the
ideals of representative democracy. Often, we have assumed that a more
impassioned commitment to self-rule was necessary. However, it is unclear
whether the push for direct democracy has caused the constitutional clock and
governmental solar system to fall out of balance or whether such initiatives are
an attempt to regain a balance already lost through failures in representation
or judicial review.70
68. See McCloskey, ed, 1 The Works of James Wilson at 113 (cited in note 37);
Hamilton, 69 NYU L Rev at 533 (cited in note 13).
69. See Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not "Republican Government-:
The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 Or L Rev 19, 31-34 (1993); Hans A. Linde,
When is Initiative Lawmaking Not "Republican Government", 17 Hastings Const L Q
159 (1989) (discussing when legislation passed by statewide plebiscite may violate constitu-
tionally guaranteed right to republican government); Hamilton, 69 NYU L Rev at 532-40
(cited in note 13).
70. Pending bills in Congress reflect the public's concern that Congress has been
abdicating its constitutional responsibility to make the hard policy choices and therefore
ducking accountability for the nation's law. See The Congressional Responsibility Act
(introduced in the Senate and the House). The structure of the Constitution demands
representatives of courage. Compare Kevin Phillips, Arrogant Capital: Washington, Wall
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Whatever answers we find, we must remember that the Framers were
correct that the ultimate goal is a balance of powers, spread between elements
that are simultaneously independent and interdependent and created for the
overriding purpose of avoiding tyranny. The system has matured into a
grandfather clock, a bit too large, a bit too ornate, but a clock that does keep
time.
Street, and the Frustration of American Politics 72 (Little Brown 1994) (discussing diffi-
culty federal government faces in "stand[ing] up for the economic interests of ordinary
Americans against the better-funded commitments of lobbyists, lawyers, investment bankers,
multinational businessmen, and trade consultants"). The fact that some, or even many,
individual representatives fail on this score is not necessarily an indictment of the system
but rather a testimony to the high standards set by the Constitution.
